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 A major challenge facing efforts to prevent the spread of biological weapons to 
“rogue” states and terrorist organizations is the dual-use nature of biotechnology: the 
fact that the same technical know-how and equipment involved in the peaceful 
development and production of vaccines and other commercial products can be diverted 
into offensive applications. This “dual-use dilemma” carries over into basic research in 
the life sciences.1 When microbiologists publish research papers that elucidate the 
process of infection, describe the molecular basis of pathogenesis, or explore the 
physiological action of toxins, they add to the existing body of knowledge and contribute 
to the development of medical therapies. Yet countries seeking biological weapons could 
utilize the same information to devise more deadly infectious agents and methods of 
delivery. Examples of such dual-use research include the unexpected discovery that 
inserting the gene for an immune-system protein renders mousepox virus more lethal 
and vaccine-resistant in mice; the identification of a smallpox protein that contributes to 
the virulence of the disease in humans; and the synthesis of poliovirus in the test tube.2 
The most serious threat of misuse of this information does not arise from 
terrorist organizations, which have limited scientific expertise, but rather from scientists 
employed by sophisticated, well-funded national BW programs. These individuals keep 
up with the scientific literature and are capable of exploiting basic research findings to 
pursue weapons-related developments. It is therefore important to address these 
                                                 
1 G. Kwik, et al., “Biosecurity: Responsible Stewardship of Bioscience in an Age of Catastrophic Terrorism,” 
Biosecurity and Bioterrorism, vol. 1, no. 1 (2003), pp. 1-9. 
2 R. J. Jackson, et al., “Expression of Mouse Interleukin-4 by a Recombinant Ectromelia Virus Suppresses 
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biological security concerns in a way that does not cause serious harm to the scientific 
enterprise.3 
In October 2003, an expert committee under the auspices of the U.S. National 
Academy of Sciences, chaired by Prof. Gerald R. Fink of MIT, published a report 
acknowledging the potential for misuse of certain basic research findings in the life 
sciences by proliferators and terrorists, and proposing a system for the voluntary review 
and self-regulation by the U.S. scientific community of seven types of “experiments of 
concern.”4 In response to the Fink Committee report, the Bush administration 
announced the creation of a National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity (NSABB) to 
advise all Federal departments and agencies that conduct or support biological research 
that could be misdirected to threaten public health or national security.5 
Because bioscience is an international enterprise, any system designed 
exclusively to regulate U.S. scientists or scientific journals will not be effective. The Fink 
Committee report acknowledged this problem, noting that “any serious attempt to 
reduce the risks associated with biotechnology must ultimately be international in scope, 
because the technologies that could be misused are available and being developed 
throughout the globe.”6 To address this problem, the committee recommended the 
creation of an “International Forum on Biosecurity” to develop harmonized national, 
regional, and international biosecurity measures. Yet the report did not suggest a 
strategy for creating a global scientific oversight system or how it might operate. 
In an early attempt to grapple with the international dimension of overseeing 
dual-use research in the life sciences, Dr. Gerald Epstein, a former deputy director for 
national security in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, proposed 
in 2001 the creation of an “international advisory group” to develop and recommend 
guidelines for national regulatory authorities and the scientific community at large. 
Epstein noted, however, that without an international treaty through which individual 
nations voluntarily subject themselves to the group’s authority, its legitimacy and 
                                                 
3 Raymond A. Zilinskas and Jonathan B. Tucker, “Limiting the Contribution of the Open Scientific Literature 
to the Biological Weapons Threat,” Journal of Homeland Security, December 2002, 
<http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Articles/Tucker.html> 
4 National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism: 
Confronting the Dual-Use Dilemma (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2003). 
5 “HHS Will Lead Government-Wide Effort to Enhance Biosecurity in ‘Dual Use’ Research,” HHS News (Press 
Release), March 4, 2004. 
6 National Research Council, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism, p. 12. 
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influence would depend on the extent to which its members were respected by their 
scientific peers.7 More recently, a policy analysis group at the University of Maryland 
developed a proposal for the multi-tiered oversight of “high-consequence” research in 
the biosciences. This proposal calls for the creation of a global standard-setting and 
review body called the “International Pathogens Research Agency,” which would define 
research activities subject to oversight and oversee the implementation of internationally 
agreed rules by national governments.8 
At present, no multilateral organization oversees “contentious” research in the 
life sciences. Nevertheless, an international scientific committee with more limited 
scope—the oversight of research with live smallpox virus—currently exists under the 
auspices of the World Health Organization (WHO). Since its inception in 1999, this body, 
known as the WHO Advisory Committee on Variola Virus Research (“variola” is the 
scientific name for smallpox) has monitored studies aimed at developing 
countermeasures against the deliberate use of smallpox as a military or terrorist 
weapon. Accordingly, the five-year track record of this committee provides an empirical 
basis for assessing the feasibility of a broader oversight mechanism to ensure the safety 
and defensive orientation of research with the most dangerous pathogens. 
 
Smallpox: Eradication and Resurgent Threat 
Smallpox, a devastating scourge that claimed hundreds of millions of lives over 
the course of human history, was eradicated in 1977 thanks to a decade-long global 
vaccination campaign led by the World Health Organization (WHO). An international 
bureaucracy based in Geneva, Switzerland, WHO does not conduct laboratory research 
but instead coordinates public health activities by member states and establishes 
international forums where technical experts can discuss scientific and policy issues and 
reach consensus on a plan of action. As an international scientific organization, WHO 
enjoys considerable prestige and credibility; it is widely seen as politically neutral and 
                                                 
7 Gerald L. Epstein, “Controlling Biological Warfare Threats: Resolving Potential Tensions Among the 
Research Community, Industry, and the National Security Community,” Critical Reviews in Microbiology, vol. 
27, no. 4 (2001), pp. 321-354. 
8 John Steinbruner, Elisa Harris, Nancy Gallagher, and Stacy Gunther, “Controlling Dangerous Pathogens: A 
Prototype Protective Oversight System” (updated Sept. 2003), 
<http://www.cissm.umd.edu/documents/pathogensmonograph.pdf> See also, John D. Steinbruner and 




serving the interests of all member states. For this reason, WHO officials can gain access 
to sensitive facilities or activities that would be denied to representatives of foreign 
governments. 
In the early 1980s, countries throughout the world responded to the eradication 
of smallpox by halting the routine vaccination of their populations against the disease, 
saving billions of dollars that could be redirected to other public health challenges. In 
1992, however, a senior Soviet defector told the CIA that Moscow had developed 
smallpox into a biological warfare agent and then gone on to mass-produce and 
stockpile the virus in multi-ton quantities.9 This revelation, combined with the 
progressive loss of population immunity, reductions in vaccine stocks, and lack of 
physician familiarity with the disease all combined to increase the threat of smallpox as 
a biological weapon.10 
In view of the epidemic potential of smallpox and its average lethality of 30 
percent, the virus heads the CDC’s list of the most dangerous bioterrorist threat 
agents.11 Although the threat of bioterrorism involving smallpox is real, it has been 
widely exaggerated: both the biology of the virus and the historical record argue against 
a scenario in which a smallpox epidemic would spread like wildfire around the world, as 
portrayed in the well-known “Dark Winter” exercise.12 Smallpox appears to be about as 
contagious as SARS, and its control would be greatly facilitated by the solid vaccine 
protection of health-care workers and first responders, a readily recognizable rash, and 
the potential for effective antiviral drug therapy and prophylaxis. 
In the mid-1970s, several years before smallpox was eradicated from the globe, 
WHO began taking steps to ensure that the disease would not reemerge as the result of 
an accidental release from a research laboratory. Given WHO’s role in leading the global 
eradication campaign, the organization claimed responsibility for overseeing all scientific 
research on smallpox. During the 1970s, WHO established safety guidelines for work 
                                                 
9 Ken Alibek with Stephen Handelman, Biohazard (New York: Random House, 1999). 
10 For an account of the eradication of smallpox and its reemergence as a bioterrorist threat, see Jonathan 
B. Tucker, Scourge: The Once and Future Threat of Smallpox (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2001). 
11 Lisa D. Rotz, Ali S. Khan, Scott R. Lillibridge, Stephen M. Ostroff, and James M. Hughes, “Public Health 
Assessment of Potential Biological Terrorism Agents,” Emerging Infectious Diseases, vol. 8, no. 2, February 
2002, <www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol8no2/01-0164.htm> 
12 Tara O’Toole and Thomas Inglesby, “Shining Light on Dark Winter,” Biodefense Quarterly, vol. 3, no. 2 
(Autumn 2001), pp. 1-3, 8-9. 
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with the virus, identified and consolidated the number of laboratories holding collections 
of smallpox isolates, and sought to regulate all future activities involving the live virus.13 
In 1979, the WHO Global Commission for the Certification of Smallpox 
Eradication issued a final report confirming that smallpox had been eradicated from the 
planet. This report made nineteen recommendations for the post-eradication era, 
including that WHO maintain no more than four collaborating centers for diagnostic 
work and scientific research on smallpox virus under conditions of maximum 
biocontainment (Biosafety Level 4, or BSL-4). Each center would report annually to WHO 
and would be inspected periodically. WHO also requested all other laboratories 
possessing stocks of smallpox virus to destroy the specimens in their possession or 
transfer them to one of the approved collaborating centers. 
In 1981, former members of the Global Commission gathered to discuss the 
implementation of the post-eradication policies. The agenda included assuring that the 
stockpile of smallpox vaccine was properly stored and maintained, archiving the records 
of the eradication program, and assessing the threat to international public health posed 
by limited outbreaks of a related viral disease, human monkeypox. The Director-General 
of WHO subsequently appointed this group as the Committee on Orthopoxvirus 
Infections, under the chairmanship of Frank Fenner, a poxvirologist from Australia.14 
After 1988, the committee no longer met on an annual basis and became an Ad Hoc 
Committee that convened only when necessary to address specific policy issues. 
By 1984, the number of WHO smallpox collaborating centers had been reduced 
to two: the Institute for Viral Preparations in Moscow, which held about 120 isolates of 
the virus, and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta, 
which held about 300 samples. In 1994, the Russian government secretly transferred 
the strain collection at the Moscow institute to the State Research Center for Virology 
and Biotechnology “Vector” in Koltsovo, Siberia, notifying WHO only after the transfer 
had occurred. Although this action violated WHO regulations, nothing could be done 
after the fact. Also in 1994, the Ad Hoc Committee on Orthopoxvirus Infections issued 
guidelines for handling smallpox DNA, which is not infectious. The committee ruled that 
“clones” (multiple copies) of pieces of the viral DNA could be distributed on request to 
                                                 
13 Frank Fenner, et al., Smallpox and Its Eradication (Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization, 
1988), pp. 1273-1276. 
14 Ibid., p. 1285. 
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legitimate research laboratories but not shared with third parties, and that no laboratory 
other than the two official WHO repositories could hold more than 20 percent of the viral 
genome, or full complement of DNA. Furthermore, smallpox DNA could not be inserted 
into vaccinia, the virus used as the smallpox vaccine, or into other animal poxviruses.15 
The Ad Hoc Committee also recommended that for safety reasons, the stocks of 
live smallpox virus held at the CDC and Vector should be destroyed in 1996, after the 
DNA sequences of representative isolates of the virus had been determined. A series of 
delays in the date of destruction ensued, however. In May 1996, the World Health 
Assembly, the annual policymaking meeting of WHO member states, agreed to set June 
30, 1999 as the date for destroying the smallpox virus stocks held at the CDC and 
Vector. But defector reports of Soviet large-scale production of smallpox virus as a 
biological weapon during the 1970s and ‘80s, along with circumstantial evidence that 
undeclared stocks of the virus might exist elsewhere in Russia and in other countries 
such as North Korea, Iraq, and Iran, increased concerns about the potential threat 
posed by smallpox.16 Accordingly, a U.S. interagency working group recommended 
postponing destruction of the virus stocks until the end of 2002 to permit the 
development of improved defenses. 
In making this decision, the U.S. government drew on a report by the Institute of 
Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences recommending an agenda for research 
with live smallpox virus, including the development of diagnostic tools, therapeutic 
drugs, and a safer vaccine.17 On May 22, 1999, the World Health Assembly followed the 
U.S. lead by adopting a resolution authorizing the “temporary retention” of the smallpox 
virus stocks at the CDC and Vector until the end of 2002, to permit “further international 
research into antiviral agents and improved vaccines” and “high-priority investigations of 
the genetic structure and pathogenesis of smallpox,” while building an international 
consensus for destruction of the viral stocks.18 
                                                 
15 World Health Organization, “Report of the Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Orthopoxvirus 
Infections,” Geneva, September 9, 1994, WHO/CDS/BVI/94.3, p. 8. 
16 Barton Gellman, “4 Nations Thought To Possess Smallpox: Iraq, N. Korea Named, Two Officials Say,” 
Washington Post, November 5, 2002, p. A1. 
17 Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, Assessment of Future Scientific Needs for Live 
Variola Virus (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1999). 
18 Judith Miller and Lawrence K. Altman, “Health Panel Recommends a Reprieve for Smallpox,” New York 
Times, May 22, 1999, p. 3. 
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The World Health Assembly also decided that all research with live smallpox virus 
would be conducted “in an open and transparent manner only with the agreement and 
under the control of WHO.” To this end, the assembly mandated the creation of a new 
WHO expert group called the Advisory Committee on Variola Virus Research. According 
to its mandate, this new body would decide what types of research should be done with 
live smallpox virus and approve and oversee all such projects; devise a mechanism for 
reporting the research results to all WHO member states; and recommend to the World 
Health Assembly when it would be feasible to destroy the virus stocks after completion 
of the agreed research agenda. Although WHO would oversee all research with live 
smallpox virus, member states would fund the work through voluntary contributions 
made outside the organization’s regular budget.19 In addition, WHO would conduct 
periodic inspections of the smallpox repositories and laboratories at CDC and Vector to 
ensure a safe working environment and the secure containment of the virus stocks. 
The World Health Assembly resolution stated that the smallpox research agenda 
was to be time-limited and completed as soon as possible, with destruction of the virus 
stocks at CDC and Vector foreseen by the end of 2002. According to D. A. Henderson, 
however, the U.S. government viewed the scientific review process as a vehicle to 
forestall destruction of the smallpox virus stocks at CDC, with the ultimate goal of 
retaining them indefinitely.20 
 
Establishment of the WHO Advisory Committee 
Because WHO had not previously been involved in smallpox research, the WHO 
Secretariat had to create the new oversight committee from scratch. Dr. Lindsey 
Martinez and Dr. David Heymann of WHO recruited Dr. Riccardo Wittek, a poxvirologist 
from the nearby University of Lausanne, to set up the committee. The Swiss 
government agreed to pay part of Wittek’s salary so that he could devote 25 percent of 
his time to selecting the committee members and developing a process for reviewing 
smallpox research proposals. In choosing the members of the advisory committee, Dr. 
Wittek sought the participation of the world’s leading poxvirologists, while also ensuring 
a broad geographical distribution as required by WHO rules. In the end, sixteen 
                                                 
19 World Health Organization, “Smallpox Eradication: WHO Advisory Committee on Variola Virus Research,” 
Weekly Epidemiological Record, vol. 75, no. 6 (February 11, 2000), pp. 45-48. 
20 Tucker/Okutani interview with D. A. Henderson, Baltimore, April 27, 2004. 
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scientists from all six WHO regions were selected as voting members. To provide 
additional expertise, ten poxvirologists from several countries were named advisers to 
the committee.21 
At the annual meetings of the WHO Advisory Committee, the participants hear 
presentations by scientists working with live smallpox virus, discuss next steps, and 
make recommendations. So far, the advisory committee has made all of its decisions by 
consensus. The committee reports its findings directly to the WHO Director-General, 
who in turn issues a report to the World Health Assembly. To ensure transparency, 
abstracts of smallpox research projects and detailed minutes of Advisory Committee 
meetings are posted on the WHO web site.22 These reports are far more detailed than 
those usually submitted to member states. Funding for the annual meetings is provided 
outside the regular WHO budget through a donation of $250,000 by the Swiss 
government.23 In addition, the United States pays for nearly all research with live 
smallpox virus at CDC and Vector. 
The first meeting of the WHO Advisory Committee on December 6-9, 1999, 
included an extensive discussion of the merits of destroying the smallpox virus stocks or 
retaining them for additional research. Like the Ad Hoc Committee before it, the 
Advisory Committee was divided into “destructionist” and “retentionist” camps, which 
continued the earlier debate.24 Four veterans of the smallpox eradication campaign who 
had witnessed the devastation caused by the virus—D. A. Henderson of the United 
States, Kalyan Bannerjee of India, Isao Arita of Japan, and Hermann Schatzmayr of 
Brazil—pressed for limiting the amount of work with the live virus and setting a date-
certain for destruction. But other members of the committee felt that given the possible 
threat of bioterrorism with smallpox, it was prudent to conduct additional defensive 
research and development. 
Both camps finally agreed on a time-limited research program with the live virus 
that focused on defined priority areas and was subject to careful WHO oversight.25 The 
Advisory Committee identified several priority areas requiring access to live smallpox 
                                                 
21 Okutani interview with Riccardo Wittek, Lausanne, Switzerland, May 7, 2004. 
22 For WHO smallpox research abstracts and reports, look under “Governance” at www.who.org 
23 Tucker/Okutani interview with Ray Arthur, CDC, July 12, 2004. 
24 Ibid. 
25 World Health Organization, “Future Research on Smallpox Virus Recommended,” Press Release WHO/77, 
December 10, 1999. 
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virus: (1) determining the full or partial DNA sequences of additional isolates; (2) 
validating improved diagnostic tests; (3) screening antiviral drugs to identify those 
suitable for treating smallpox; (4) developing and producing monoclonal antibodies to 
treat the disease; (5) developing a safer vaccine, although this work would not 
necessarily require access to smallpox virus; and (6) creating a model of smallpox in a 
non-human primate to facilitate testing of antiviral drugs, vaccines, and diagnostics.26 
Because the smallpox work program was limited to practical, near-term studies, 
the Advisory Committee rejected some areas of research as overly ambitious or open-
ended. For example, a proposal for a broad-based program of drug development, 
including biopharmaceuticals such as interferons and chemokines, was rejected because 
such research would extend beyond the end-2002 deadline. Instead, the Advisory 
Committee decided that the development program should focus on previously identified 
drug candidates. Similarly, when some members of the committee argued for a program 
of basic research on smallpox virus, others urged that such work be given a low priority 
because it would require scarce space in the maximum-containment laboratory at CDC. 
It was ultimately agreed that some basic research would be conducted in parallel with 
applied work, but with specific benchmarks and defined endpoints.27 Moreover, many 
types of basic research did not require access to live smallpox virus and could be 
conducted with noninfectious viral DNA or proteins expressed from it. 
Although all research with live smallpox virus must take place in the BSL-4 
laboratories at CDC and Vector, the work may be conducted by outside scientists who 
have been authorized by WHO. For example, teams from the U.S. Army Medical 
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) at Fort Detrick, Maryland, and the 
Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) at Porton Down, England, have 
conducted research with the live virus at CDC. 
 
Operation of the WHO Advisory Committee 
To review all smallpox research proposals prior to submission to national funding 
agencies, WHO staff selected a Scientific Subcommittee made up of five practicing 
                                                 
26 World Health Organization, WHO Advisory Committee on Variola Virus Research, “Report of a WHO 
Meeting,” Geneva, 6-9 December 1999, WHO/CDS/CSR/2000.1. 
27 D. A. Henderson, “Meeting of the WHO Variola Research Committee,” December 6-9, 1999, unofficial 
memo for the record. 
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poxvirologists, including one each from CDC and Vector. This structure was designed to 
permit a rapid turn-around of research proposals, while ensuring consistency with WHO 
priorities and time constraints. The initial members of the Scientific Subcommittee were 
Dr. Brian Mahy (CDC, USA), Dr. Sergei N. Shchelkunov (Vector, Russia), Dr. Robert 
Drillien (INSERM, France), Dr. Geoffrey L. Smith (Imperial College of Medicine, UK), and 
Dr. Robert Snoeck (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium). 
The review of smallpox research proposals is straightforward and based on 
scientific merit and biosafety requirements. Members of the Scientific Subcommittee 
write comments on each proposal, after which Dr. Wittek seeks clarifications and 
prepares a consensus report with specific recommendations.28 Overall, the peer-review 
process has helped researchers to remain focused on the agreed goals and timeframe of 
the smallpox research program. According to CDC poxvirologist Joseph Esposito, “I’m 
impressed by how carefully the issues are vetted—you can sit there for an hour talking 
over one small point. But most of the time the juice is worth the squeeze.”29 
During the second meeting of the WHO Advisory Committee on February 15-16, 
2001, members received an update of progress in the various research areas.30 Seven 
months later, the terrorist attacks against New York and Washington on September 11, 
2001, and the subsequent mailings of anthrax bacterial spores, heightened the 
perception of a potential bioterrorist threat involving smallpox. Three months after the 
events of 9/11, the WHO Advisory Committee held its third meeting on December 3-4, 
2001. By now it was clear that although important progress in smallpox research had 
been achieved, “significant components” of the agreed program would not be completed 
by the end of 2002. The Advisory Committee therefore recommended another delay in 
destroying the viral stocks.31 
When the World Health Assembly convened in May 2002, the lingering impact of 
9/11 caused many countries that had previously sought to destroy the smallpox virus 
stocks to support ongoing defensive research. Accordingly, WHO members agreed to 
extend the research program beyond the December 2002 deadline, without setting a 
                                                 
28 Okutani interview with Riccardo Wittek, Lausanne, Switzerland, May 7, 2004. 
29 Tucker interview with Joseph Esposito, CDC, July 13, 2004. 
30 World Health Organization, WHO Advisory Committee on Variola Virus Research, “Report of the Second 
Meeting,” Geneva, 15-16 February 2001, WHO/CDS/CSR/EDC/2001.17. 
31 World Health Organization, WHO Advisory Committee on Variola Virus Research, “Report of the Third 
Meeting,” Geneva, 3-4 December 2001, WHO/CDS/CSR/GAR/2002.3. 
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specific date for destruction. Instead, retention of the virus stocks was left open-ended, 
pending completion of the full set of research objectives. At the same time, the World 
Health Assembly reaffirmed the mandate of the WHO Advisory Committee to review, 
approve, and monitor all research with live smallpox virus at CDC and Vector, while 
ensuring that the approved projects remained “outcome-focused and time-limited.”32 
At its fourth meeting on November 20-21, 2002, the WHO Advisory Committee 
discussed a number of biosafety issues related to smallpox research, including the 
simultaneous handling of smallpox and related poxviruses within the same maximum-
containment lab; the insertion into smallpox virus of “reporter” genes, such as one 
encoding a green fluorescent protein; the expression of smallpox genes in other 
poxviruses; and the distribution of smallpox DNA and its synthesis in the test tube. 
Although the research guidelines established in 1994 by the Ad Hoc Committee on 
Orthpoxvirus Infections had banned all such activities, the WHO Advisory Committee 
recognized that these rules “were now open to challenge because of the technological 
advances that have been made since the existing guidelines were first introduced.” To 
advise the WHO on these matters, the Advisory Committee formed a Technical 
Subcommittee of experts in molecular biology who would review the issues and develop 
revised guidelines for research with smallpox virus.33 
At the fifth meeting of the WHO Advisory Committee on November 4-5, 2003,  
the Technical Subcommittee gave its opinion on the four unresolved policy issues. After 
lengthy discussion, the Advisory Committee recommended that these issues and the 
views of committee members be referred to the WHO Biosafety Advisory Group to 
determine the appropriate level of biocontainment for various experiments. The four 
issues would then be referred to the Ad Hoc Committee on Orthopoxvirus Infections for 
final adjudication.34 
What is the current status of the smallpox research program? A group of 
poxvirologists recently estimated that the development of two anti-smallpox drugs that 
work by different mechanisms will require an investment of seven to ten years and $1.5 
                                                 
32 Fifty-Fifth World Health Assembly, Agenda Item 13.16, “Smallpox Eradication: Destruction of Variola virus 
Stocks,” Ninth Plenary Meeting, WHA55.15, May 18, 2002. 
33 WHO Advisory Committee on Variola Virus Research, “Report of the Fourth Meeting,” Geneva, 20-21 
November 2002, WHO/CDS/CSR/GAR/2003.5, p. 6. 
34 WHO Advisory Committee on Variola Virus Research, “Report of the Fifth Meeting,” Geneva, 4-5 
November 2003, pp. 7-8. 
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to $2.5 billion.35 An animal model of smallpox has already been developed, and one of 
the two required antiviral drugs (cidofovir) is already licensed, although an effort is now 
being made to develop an orally available form. Once the stated objectives of the 
smallpox research program have been achieved, will the WHO Advisory Committee 
recommend destruction of the virus stocks? According to Dr. James Hughes, director of 
CDC’s National Center for Infectious Diseases (NCID), “That is the expectation. We’ll see 
where we are when that day comes.”36 
CDC virologist James LeDuc believes that it is not too early to begin preparing for 
the “endgame” of the smallpox research program with respect to technical issues 
surrounding the possible destruction of the smallpox virus stocks, but he is realistic 
about the political feasibility of destruction. “There are two separate universes: one is 
the science, which is eventually going to be completed, and the other is politics,” he 
says. “I don’t think the politics are ever going to let us destroy anything, at least in the 
current environment.”37  
 
Controversial Policy Issues 
 Three issues addressed by the WHO Advisory Committee have been particularly 
contentious, raising important issues of scientific oversight. 
 
Destruction of Chimeric Viruses 
During the 1970s and early 1980s, British virologist Keith Dumbell created 
“chimeric” poxviruses containing a mixture of genetic material by infecting cells 
simultaneously with smallpox virus and an animal poxvirus, such as rabbitpox or 
cowpox. When the British strain collection was transferred to the CDC, the chimeric 
poxviruses were included. Vials containing these viruses have been stored in a liquid-
nitrogen freezer at CDC for decades and have not been opened even to test the cultures 
for viability. 
At its meeting in 2002, the WHO Advisory Committee agreed by consensus to 
recommend destruction of the chimeras, although copies of the viral DNA could be 
                                                 
35 Stephen B. Harrison et al., “Discovery of Antivirals Against Smallpox,” Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, vol. 101, no. 31 (August 3, 2004), p. 11188. 
36 Tucker/Okutani interview with James Hughes, CDC, July 12, 2004. 
37 Tucker/Okutani interview with James LeDuc, CDC, September 16, 2004. 
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preserved. The reason for this decision was that because improved techniques have 
since been developed for determining the function of particular genes, there would be 
no scientific merit in studying Dumbell’s chimeras. Reducing the size of the smallpox 
strain collection would also be consistent with the Advisory Committee’s mandate to help 
build an international consensus for destruction of the virus stocks. 
U.S. government officials, however, balked at the WHO Advisory Committee’s 
recommendation. A spokesperson for the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, which oversees CDC, said that the WHO committee was only “part of the 
process” and that the United States viewed the chimeric viruses as an integral part of 
the collection of smallpox virus isolates that the World Health Assembly had decided 
should be retained for research. This controversy also raised new questions about the 
international legal status of the virus stocks held at CDC and Vector.38 Are the two 
repository countries holding the stocks in trust for the world community? Do the original 
owners have some residual rights over the fate of the stocks? Do the CDC and Vector 
derive special legal authority from their physical control of the virus collections? 
CDC scientists Joseph Esposito and James LeDuc contend that the chimeras 
retain some scientific value. Two types of experiments might be performed with them: 
testing antiviral drugs against the chimeric viruses, which may respond differently 
because they are recombinants; and extracting DNA from the chimeras in order to test 
new diagnostic methods to see how well they recognize the insertion of foreign genes 
into smallpox virus. CDC plans to do both experiments, after which the chimeras could 
potentially be destroyed.39 There are political obstacles, however. “We can’t just go in 
and destroy them—we first need approval from our government,” LeDuc explained. 
“Right now that’s not forthcoming, so we find ourselves in a bit of a difficult situation.”40 
At its fifth meeting in 2003, the WHO Advisory Committee expressed impatience 
with the CDC’s failure to destroy the chimeras and suggested that “WHO should 
approach the responsible authorities of the collaborating centres to implement the 
recommendations concerning the destruction of these virus isolates.”41 The success of 
                                                 
38 Nell Boyce, “Smallpox Mixes Make a Stir,” U.S. News and World Report, January 19, 2004. 
39 Tucker interview with Joseph Esposito, July 13, 2004; Tucker/Okutani interview with James LeDuc, 
September 16, 2004. 
40 Tucker/Okutani interview with James LeDuc, CDC, September 16, 2004. 
41 WHO Advisory Committee on Variola Virus Research, “Report of the Fifth Meeting,” Geneva, 4-5 
November 2003, p. 3. 
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such an effort seems doubtful, however, because NCID director Hughes claims that he 
does not have the authority to destroy the stocks. “At the end of the day, any decision 
to destroy anything will have to be made at a higher level,” he said.42 Because the 
United States government as a whole is a member of WHO, any action affecting the 
smallpox virus collection is a political-scientific decision that will have to be made 
through the interagency policy-making process. 
Senior Bush administration officials oppose the destruction of the chimeric 
viruses on the grounds that it could become a “slippery slope.” If the United States were 
to agree to destroy a portion of the CDC collection, they argue, that precedent would 
lead to a renewed debate each year over whether or not to destroy an additional 
tranche. Indeed, WHO Advisory Committee members Bannerjee and Schatzmayr argued 
early on for destroying all but six representative isolates. According to White House 
officials, the U.S. government will be prepared to destroy the smallpox virus stocks only 
when the biodefense research agenda has been completed and the virus is no longer 
needed. Until that goal has been achieved, reducing the size of the CDC collection “will 
not make the world any safer.”43 
 
Insertion of a Reporter Gene Into Smallpox Virus 
The second controversy concerns a proposal by Dr. John Huggins of USAMRIID 
to insert into smallpox virus a foreign “reporter” gene that codes for a green fluorescent 
protein (GFP) to permit rapid detection of viral replication in infected cells. Because this 
technique provides a rapid, non-subjective readout of drug effect, it would facilitate the 
screening of smallpox-killing drugs. Nevertheless, the GFP gene-insertion experiment is 
the only smallpox research proposal that the Advisory Committee has sent back to the 
investigators for revision. One reason is that the research guidelines established by the 
Ad Hoc Committee on Orthopoxvirus Infections in 1994 prohibit any genetic 
manipulation of the smallpox virus. 
The insertion into viruses of reporter genes such as GFP is now a standard 
technique for the rapid screening of antiviral drugs to assess their effectiveness, and it 
would clearly facilitate the process of developing new drugs to treat smallpox. Even so, 
the proposal has aroused biosafety concerns. At its third meeting in 2001, the WHO 
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Advisory Committee agreed that “an extensive and reasoned risk analysis was needed” 
for the GFP gene-insertion proposal and requested an advisory opinion from WHO’s 
Biosafety Advisory Group.44 In 2003, the Advisory Committee concluded that the 
reporter-gene experiment should be allowed if compelling reasons exist for generating 
such recombinants and risk analysis determines that insertion of the marker gene would 
not alter the biological properties of the smallpox virus.45 To date, GFP has been 
introduced into several viruses without affecting their virulence, and no evidence 
indicates that the insertion of a single marker gene into smallpox would increase the 
ability of the virus to cause disease. 
On a more philosophical level, however, some members of the Advisory 
Committee expressed concern that allowing any genetic engineering of smallpox virus, 
however benign the intended purpose, could open the door to more dangerous 
manipulations. Accordingly, the committee was forced to balance the scientific benefits 
of the experiments against the political liabilities. At the fifth meeting of the Advisory 
Committee, the Technical Subcommittee recommended approving the insertion of the 
GFP gene into smallpox virus but urged that all materials and stocks of recombinant 
virus be destroyed at the end of the experiment.46 According to CDC virologist Brian 
Mahy, the Advisory Committee believes that the insertion of a reporter gene into 
smallpox virus is a special case that would not set a broader precedent.47 
 
Insertion of Smallpox Genes into Other Poxviruses 
A still more contentious issue involves the proposed insertion of smallpox genes 
into animal poxviruses. For example, some scientists want to take genes that might 
serve as antiviral drug targets and insert them into vaccinia, a relatively benign poxvirus 
that serves as the vaccine against smallpox. Advocates of this proposal argue that the 
introduction of individual smallpox genes into vaccinia could be useful for testing 
antiviral drugs and monoclonal antibodies in small-animal models without the risks of 
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working with intact smallpox virus.48 Such genetic-engineering experiments are 
controversial, however, because they have the potential to be misused for offensive 
purposes and could set a dangerous precedent. The CDC’s LeDuc believes that although 
each experiment should be assessed on its own merits, the default policy should be not 
to use smallpox genes for this type of research. He notes that other poxviruses are 
much safer to work with and do not entail the political sensitivities associated with 
smallpox.49 
At the fifth meeting of the WHO Advisory Committee, the Technical 
Subcommittee recommended that the insertion of smallpox genes into other poxviruses 
be permitted if a detailed risk analysis demonstrates that expression of the gene is 
unlikely to alter the biological properties of the recombinant virus. Furthermore, only 
single genes would be inserted, and all such experiments would be performed at a high 
level of containment (BSL-3). Some members of the Advisory Committee disagreed with 
this recommendation, however, on the grounds that “the full scope of the issues under 
consideration was felt to be beyond the expertise of members of the technical 
subcommittee alone.”50 The issue was therefore referred to the reconvened Ad Hoc 
Committee on Orthopoxvirus Infections for a final decision. 
 
Limits to the Authority of the Advisory Committee 
No decisions by the WHO are legally binding (with the sole exception of the 
International Health Regulations). The organization also lacks formal enforcement 
powers and cannot compel member states to carry out its decisions. As a result, the 
Advisory Committee’s authority to oversee smallpox research rests on the politically 
binding 1999 resolution of the World Health Assembly that created the committee and 
the 2002 resolution extending its mandate, both of which were endorsed by consensus. 
The recommendations of the WHO Advisory Committee carry a certain authority and 
moral weight because they are made by recognized experts on the basis of objective 
scientific and safety criteria. In the case of the United States and Russia, political self-
interest also plays a role: without the international legitimacy provided by the WHO 
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Advisory Committee, the World Health Assembly would not have authorized retention of 
the smallpox virus stocks at CDC and Vector for biodefense research. 
In general, the record of voluntary cooperation with WHO resolutions has been 
good. During the 1970s, most countries complied with WHO’s request either to destroy 
their smallpox virus stocks or transfer them to a designated collaborating center. A 
prominent exception, however, was the Soviet Union and then Russia, which violated 
WHO rules by weaponizing smallpox during the 1970s and transferring its smallpox virus 
collection from Moscow to Siberia in 1994 without prior notification. Russia is also 
suspected of maintaining stocks of smallpox virus outside the official WHO repository, 
possibly at a Ministry of Defense facility near the city of Sergiev Posad. 
Although compliance with WHO decisions is generally expected, there are few 
real consequences for failing to do so. According to WHO’s David Heymann, “We have 
no mechanism for enforcing our recommendations, for example, with respect to 
destruction of the chimeric viruses. The only way to strengthen this recommendation 
would be for the World Health Assembly to approve a resolution that the chimeras 
should be destroyed, but in that case the United States would not sign on. Resolutions 
are binding on WHO member countries only to the extent that they agree to them.”51 As 
D. A. Henderson has observed, “If the United States chooses to ignore a 
recommendation of the WHO Advisory Committee, there are few sanctions that the 
committee could or would impose.”52 
The effectiveness of the Advisory Committee has been handicapped by a lack of 
resources. No funding has been made available by member countries to employ a full-
time staffer at WHO to support the committee’s research. As a result, the WHO 
Secretariat has not been effective at addressing some of the policy issues concerning 
smallpox research or engaging the appropriate experts in discussions. Overall, LeDuc 
observes, “WHO has not taken its oversight role to the next level.”53 The mandate of the 
WHO Advisory Committee is also limited to technical issues and does not extend to 
political matters such as destruction of the smallpox virus stocks. Its role is to make 
recommendations on the steps needed to build an international consensus on when, 
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from a scientific standpoint, it would be safe to destroy the virus. Any decision on 
destruction will ultimately be made by politicians, not scientists. 
 
Conclusions 
The WHO Advisory Committee on Variola Virus Research has set a useful 
precedent for the international oversight of scientific work with a lethal and contagious 
virus. To what extent is this experience applicable to oversight of research with other 
dangerous pathogens? Is smallpox unique because it involves an eradicated disease for 
which the causative agent is limited to two official repositories? 
According to the CDC’s James Hughes, the WHO Advisory Committee “has 
worked well to bring people together from around the world to evaluate and monitor 
this activity in a systematic way.”54 By ensuring that smallpox research is subject to 
international scientific oversight and a high degree of transparency, the process ensures 
that the live virus used exclusively for benign purposes and has helped to mitigate the 
fears of other countries that the United States and Russia might exploit their special 
access to the virus stocks for offensive purposes. At the same time, the value of the 
review process is limited by the fact that it applies only to “declared” smallpox research. 
Because the WHO process does not cover any clandestine research on smallpox that 
may be going on, it may ultimately fail to prevent the illicit use of the virus. 
A key element of the institutional design of the WHO oversight system is the 
separation of political and scientific authority. The 190 WHO member countries 
represented in the World Health Assembly vote on politically binding resolutions that set 
the overall direction of the organization’s work, but they leave it to scientists to 
determine how best to achieve the desired results. Although the WHO Advisory 
Committee must take account of the political environment in which it operates, its 
oversight of smallpox research is based on scientific peer review, with an emphasis on 
biosafety and effective experimental design. Another important feature of the Advisory 
Committee is that the WHO rule requiring broad geographic distribution of its members 
has increased the international legitimacy of the smallpox research program. Because 
relevant expertise in poxvirology is not evenly distributed geographically, WHO has also 
made institutional accommodations, such as the recruitment of non-voting scientific 
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advisers, to ensure that peer review of smallpox research is of the highest possible 
caliber. It will also be critical, however, that any benefits from the research program be 
widely shared among WHO member states and not subject to exclusive patent rights.  
Several aspects of the WHO Advisory Committee process distinguish it from the 
scientific oversight mechanism currently being developed in the United States. Rather 
than being limited to scientists, the 25 members of the National Scientific Advisory 
Board on Biosecurity (NSABB) will represent a variety of different interests—security, 
intelligence, scientific, and political—complicating the operation of the oversight process. 
Moreover, in contrast to the WHO Advisory Committee, the NSABB will explicitly consider 
national security concerns when reviewing scientific research proposals rather than 
limiting its oversight to scientific and safety issues. 
Can international scientific oversight be extended to research with other 
dangerous pathogens? It is clear that WHO’s leadership of the global smallpox 
eradication campaign enabled it to carve out a central role for itself in determining 
where and how research with the live smallpox virus is conducted. In view of this 
precedent, the WHO Advisory Committee process is most directly applicable to polio, 
which is currently the target of a worldwide vaccination campaign under WHO auspices. 
If polio eradication is brought to a successful conclusion over the next few years, WHO 
will probably establish an international advisory committee to examine issues related to 
the post-eradication research agenda for poliovirus. 
Because polio is far less deadly than smallpox and has never been developed as 
a biological weapon, it does not pose the same magnitude of threat of possible terrorist 
use. Nevertheless, as soon as poliovirus disappears from nature and the routine 
vaccination of children ends, serious biosafety and biosecurity concerns will arise, 
including several issues already encountered with smallpox.55 For this reason, WHO has 
begun compiling a comprehensive inventory of laboratories that possess stocks of 
poliovirus, so that the strain collections can be consolidated and secured. “Locking 
down” poliovirus will be a daunting task, however, because specimens containing the 
virus are stored in many thousands of labs around the world and because U.S. scientists 
recently synthesized poliovirus in the test tube.  
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To what extent can the WHO Advisory Committee on Variola Virus Research be 
seen as the embryo of a broader system of international oversight for “contentious” 
research in the life sciences? Because of the dual threats of emerging infectious diseases 
and bioterrorism, a growing number of scientists around the world are working with 
dangerous pathogens, yet no system yet exists for licensing laboratories and researchers 
involved in such sensitive research. At the same time, new concerns have emerged over 
the potential malicious use of advances in the life sciences. The Australian mousepox 
experiment and the synthesis of poliovirus have created the growing conviction, both 
inside and outside the scientific community, that certain types of potentially hazardous 
research in the life sciences require international oversight to ensure both safety and 
security. 
In some ways, the current situation resembles that of the early 1970s, when the 
advent of recombinant DNA technology appeared to pose serious risks for public health 
and the environment. The Asilomar Conference in February 1975, and the subsequent 
establishment of the National Institutes of Health guidelines and the Recombinant DNA 
Advisory Committee, provided an important measure of security and reassurance, while 
giving scientists rather than politicians primary responsibility for the oversight of their 
work.56 
The accelerating pace of research in microbiology and molecular biology is 
clearly generating risks that warrant a coordinated international response. In October 
2004, for example, a research team at the University of Wisconsin published a paper 
describing the genetic factors that might explain the extraordinarily virulence of the 
1918 strain of influenza virus, or Spanish Flu, which killed more than 20 million people 
worldwide. Using DNA sequences reconstructed from preserved tissues of victims of the 
1918 pandemic, the Wisconsin scientists inserted 1918-type DNA segments into ordinary 
flu virus in order to pinpoint which genes made the virus so lethal. Although this work 
was initially conducted in a maximum-containment (BSL-4) laboratory in Canada, it was 
later transferred to a lower-security (BSL-3) laboratory. Publication of the paper sparked 
a heated controversy over whether or not the research warranted a higher level of 
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biocontainment and should have been conducted in the first place. Yet no scientific 
oversight mechanism was in place to review these decisions in advance.57  
WHO’s central role in the eradication of smallpox and its current effort to 
eradicate polio give the organization special credibility and authority with respect to the 
oversight of research involving these two viruses. It seems unlikely, however, that the 
organization could readily extend its oversight authority to other dangerous pathogens. 
Although WHO provides important technical advice on the handling of emerging disease 
agents, such as SARS and monkeypox, it does not exert the same degree of authority 
over the scope of research being undertaken. Moreover, the causative agents of 
diseases such as anthrax, plague, and Ebola hemorrhagic fever are all available in 
nature, and each agent is associated with a unique set of scientific and public health 
issues that must be addressed individually. 
Nevertheless, given the benefits of international scientific oversight of smallpox 
virus research, including improved accountability, legitimacy, and reassurance about 
defensive intent, the possibility of creating such a mechanism for all types of 
“contentious” research in the life sciences should be explored. If and when such a 
system becomes politically feasible, its basic building blocks are already available in 
WHO’s oversight of smallpox virus research. 
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